Since the 2008 financial crisis, austerity has been deployed as a public policy geared towards reducing sovereign debt and restoring economic order, on the one hand, and descried as an example of punitive moralizing by political and economic elites, on the other. This article challenges the economic understanding of the concept of austerity. Some recent examples from popular culture are adduced to indicate societal dissatisfaction with the accumulation of material things, examples of what has been called 'the new minimalism'. Contextualizing this phenomenon within a culture of intensive consumption, it is argued here that there is a history of austerity as an aversion to ostentation and excess in western tradition that runs from the Stoics through to recent pronouncements by Pope Francis and that provides a vantage point from which to question the economistic deployment of the term. When understood in this way, the austere can be seen to carry an important political meaning today and may contribute to the sorts of transformation necessary in order to reduce material demand on a societal scale.
This article is part of the themed issue 'Material demand reduction'.
Introduction
The problem that frames this collection of essays is how to mitigate the effects of global warming through the reduction of demand for material objects. Implicit in this formulation is the recognition that there is no solely technological solution to this question. It is not simply an issue of how to make things out of materials that do not involve fossil fuels in their manufacture, use or demise. If it were, it might then be a question of the economic viability of these alternative ideas with regard to research and development, cost of production, etc. To reduce demand, on the other hand, implies changes in consumption that entail modifications of behaviour as well as the production of goods. These changes may take various forms, including adaptation to resource limits through a sense of individual moral obligation or more community-focused collective action around concepts of sufficiency, the so-called 'communing', the sharing society, the 'degrowth' movement or the embrace of such indigenous belief systems as 'buen vivir' in Ecuador and others elsewhere in South America.
Most of these efforts are motivated, at least in part, by ecological awareness. But they have also been taking place since the 2008 financial crisis in a global political and economic context of austerity measures promoting drastic cuts in government spending. The draconian fiscal policies imposed on the governments of Greece, Ireland and Portugal by the so-called Troika of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Commission (EC) during the Eurozone crisis are only the most dramatic examples of these measures. The UK Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron, meanwhile, legitimated his government's cuts in public services by announcing 'The age of austerity' in 2009 (http:// conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/601367). As a result of these actions, the concept of austerity has been couched in entirely negative, disciplinary terms as a bedrock of neoliberal worldview. But a historical reconsideration of the concept as a moral category entailing a rejection of ostentation might provide the basis for a political response to the neoliberal hegemony that has solidified as a response to the financial crisis and further the ecological goal of mitigating global warming. In order to see this possibility, it is helpful to contrast this alternative notion of austerity not only with its usage in recent economic discourse, as will be explicated below, but first with a recent phenomenon in popular culture in the USA and elsewhere that signals a measure of dissatisfaction with the accumulation of things.
The new minimalism
There is some evidence to suggest that increasing affluence leads to less demand for material objects and an increase in demand for services. 1 One of the services that appears to be growing in demand is for 'organizers', as evidenced most spectacularly by the best-selling books by Marie Kondo (The Life-Changing Magic of Tidying Up has sold over 6 million copies alone and been on the New York Times best-seller list of advice books for close to 2 years) but also by the existence in the USA of the National Association of Professional Organizers (NAPO), which describes itself as a group of '4000 organizing and productivity professionals dedicated to helping people and organizations bring order and efficiency to their lives' (http://www.napo.net/?page=about_ us). The combination of 'order' and 'efficiency' signals the need and desire to either get rid of superfluous stuff or find somewhere to stash it, turning individual lives and businesses into metaphorical closets in need of material triage and/or organizing. The message here, implicit in some cases but explicit in Kondo's lifestyle argot, is that we have too much stuff around us, too much stuff leads to a chaotic environment, and reducing the chaos will reward us with not only happiness but 'joy' [2] .
Kondo is only the most popular, if also the most idiosyncratic, example of a predominantly American phenomenon that is giving minimalism a bad name. Two weeks after a New York Times Magazine's article on Kondo appeared, the same magazine published a piece by Kyle Chayka entitled 'The oppressive gospel of "minimalism"'. The representative example cited of the new gospel was not Kondo but rather an online essay by hedge fund manager James Altucher entitled 'How minimalism brought me freedom and joy' (http://www.jamesaltucher.com/2016/ 04/minimalism-brought-freedom-joy/). Altucher proudly announces in the opening of his essay that 'I have one bag of clothes, one backpack with a computer, iPad, and phone. I have zero other possessions'. Though Part pop philosophy and part aesthetic, minimalism presents a cure-all for a certain sense of capitalist overindulgence. Maybe we have a hangover from pre-recession excessMcMansions, S.U.V.s, neon cocktails, fusion cuisine-and minimalism is the salutary tonic. Or perhaps it's a method of coping with recession-induced austerity, a collective spiritual and cultural cleanse because we've been forced to consume less anyway. But as an outgrowth of a peculiarly American (that is to say, paradoxical and self-defeating) brand of Puritanical asceticism, this new minimalist lifestyle always seems to end in enabling new modes of consumption, a veritable excess of less. It's not really minimal at all [3] .
Chayka particularly zeroes in on the contents of Altucher's bag, noting that 'The movement, such as it is, is led in large part by a group of men who gleefully ditch their possessions as if to disavow the advantages by which they obtained them. But it takes a lot to be minimalist: social capital, a safety net and access to the internet. The technology we call minimalist might fit in our pockets, but it depends on a vast infrastructure of grim, air-conditioned server farms and even grimmer Chinese factories.' As in architectural minimalism, it seems, the necessary supporting infrastructure can be deceptively kept out of sight.
The minimalism phenomenon that can here be seen in American popular culture and the criticisms of it bring several important issues into view. In focusing on Altucher's essay, which is only one among several in the genre, Chayka decries the elitism he sees at its core. This is echoed by others who point out the necessity of having a lot of stuff in order to feel the need to get rid of it, encompassing not only rich hedge fund managers but middle-class Americans in general as well (see also [4, 5] ). Chayka also suggests several instigators of the minimalist discourse worth considering, including a reaction against the perceived excesses of consumption that resulted in the 2008 economic crisis, adjustment to a new reality of reduced wealth or a recidivist Protestant asceticism, or some combination of all three. He also points to the obvious irony that paring down is connected to new modes of consumption (as well as some old ones, as can be seen in the marketing of Kondo's 'KonMari method' or Altucher's books). In this sense, the minimalist craze can be seen as expressive of contemporary capitalism's capacity to turn anything into a commodity, including the criticism of high-intensity commodity consumption.
Thus, the discourse of minimalism is enmeshed in the question of the demand for material objects and the complex interrelation of the meanings and values ascribed to things. Keeping in mind the list of contexts in which Chayka situates the minimalist phenomenon, I want to suggest that any significant reduction in demand will require a change in the social structure that sustains our present mode of production and consumption in advanced industrial, capitalist societies. How fundamental a change is required can be seen by refocusing from the moral and aesthetic concept of minimalism to a rehabilitation of the sometimes related concept of the austere.
The austere lifeboat
If in Europe the esoteric gesture was often only a pretext for the blindest self-interest, the concept of austerity, though hardly ship-shape or watertight, still seems, in emigration, the most acceptable lifeboat. Only a few, admittedly, have a seaworthy example at their disposal. To most boarders, it threatens starvation or madness [6] .
'Austerity' is not an economic category, yet we encounter it almost daily nowadays as an economic modifier [7] . Since the 2008 economic crisis, a variety of policies have been proposed and/or imposed in a wide range of contexts to reduce government spending and otherwise tighten the collective belt. The policies hearken back to the etymological origin of the term, which denotes a harsh or bitter taste. Austerity measures are bitter pills. This notion of austerity, as noted above, is the one popularly in use. However, there is a second sense of austerity, one denoting an aversion to ostentation and excess. The political significance of the difference between this meaning of austerity and the popular one is the core of what follows.
The bitter pill of what have come to be called austerity policies is justified, in economic terms, by the expectation that these policies will rectify market imbalances and lead, in the long term, to economic growth. Much of the criticism of these policies focuses on exactly this point, attempting to demonstrate that they have failed. In April 2013, University of Massachusetts economists Robert Pollin and Michael Ash reported on research they had conducted along with a PhD student, Thomas Herndon, that revealed statistical flaws and coding errors in an academic paper that had appeared 3 years earlier, written by Harvard economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, which claimed that economic growth fell off sharply when national debts reached 90% of gross domestic product. Reinhart-Rogoff had been cited by the likes of US Speaker of the House Paul Ryan and the UK's Chancellor of the Exchequer during the Cameron government, George Osborne, in their arguments to cut government spending and reduce public debt. The University of Massachusetts economists showed that the argument concerning the 90% threshold is false, throwing 'austerity economics' into doubt. Nobel Laureate and New York Times op-ed columnist Paul Krugman and others then relied on this critique to argue in favour of increased spending in a slump and to say that austerity policies do not work in such a setting (http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2013/04/the-rogoffand-reinhart-controversy-a-summing-up.html). Further, given that these policies demonstrably do not work, their continued pursuance must be based on a moral argument rather than an economic one: '"debt is evil, debtors must pay for their sins, and from now on we all must live within our means". And that kind of moralizing is the reason we're mired in a seemingly endless slump' (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/01/opinion/01krugman.html?pagewanted=print).
Adam Smith's views on the matter are instructive here. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith judged every prodigal an enemy, every frugal man a friend of the public good because the first squandered and the second augmented the national capital [8] . This focus on productive versus unproductive expenditure led Ronald Blyth to argue that Smith's emphasis on parsimony provides 'the moral arguments against debt that still resonate today', and are thus among the intellectual foundations of contemporary austerity measures ( [7] , p. 114). But Smith was not as contemporary as all that. Still with one foot in an older tradition of political economy, Smith deployed the term austere in what I have characterized as the second, critical sense.
In every civilized society, in every society where the distinction of ranks has once been completely established, there have been always two different schemes or systems of morality current at the same time; of which the one may be called the strict or austere; the other the liberal, or, if you will, the loose system. The former is generally admired and revered by the common people: The latter is commonly more esteemed and adopted by what are called people of fashion. The degree of disapprobation with which we ought to mark the vices of levity, the vices which are apt to arise from great prosperity, and from the excess of gaiety and good humour, seems to constitute the principal distinction between those two opposite schemes or systems ( [8] , p. 794).
Smith's categorization of two moral systems, the austere and the liberal, is grounded in the distinction of 'ranks', and the dynamic between the two systems that he goes on to describe will be important to what I want to explore further. 'Almost all religious sects have begun among the common people, from whom they have generally drawn their earliest, as well as their most numerous proselytes', Smith notes.
The austere system of morality has, accordingly, been adopted by those sects almost constantly, or with very few exceptions; for there have been some. It was the system by which they could best recommend themselves to that order of people to whom they first The 'vices of levity' are always ruinous to the common people, Smith observed. The 'people of fashion', whose moral system is the liberal one, 'are very apt to consider the power of indulging in some degree of excess as one of the advantages of their fortune, and the liberty of doing so without censure or reproach, as one of the privileges which belong to their station. In people of their own station, therefore, they regard such excesses with but a small degree of disapprobation, and censure them either very slightly or not at all' ([8], p. 794) . But the common people might view such indulgence differently. Thus in contrast to the elitist patina of the minimalism movement, Smith uncovers an anti-elite connotation of the austere that has clear moral and political implications.
The austere life as a statement of moral and political disapprobation has a long history, the ur-model in the western tradition being Socrates. Famously ridiculed by Aristophanes and celebrated by Plato alike for his unconventionality, Socrates flaunted his indifference to money, claiming his poverty as a sign of his virtue in a democratic Athens that he saw as morally corrupted by the pursuit of pleasure and material wealth (Apology 23b-c). In this, Socrates was updating an earlier Athenian stance of moral superiority over a decadent Persia. In The Republic, Plato signified how far Athens had fallen in the episode in the second book where Socrates is building a just city in words. Our needs, he says, will create the city, and from this he constructs a version of a simple division of labour that serves to satisfy minimal needs. When he describes a diet of vegetables, olives, cheese, figs, beans and so on, Glaucon objects that he is describing a 'city of pigs'. Socrates replies 'All right, I understand. It isn't merely the origin of a city that we're considering, it seems, but the origin of a luxurious city. And that may not be a bad idea, for by examining it, we might very well see how justice and injustice grow up in cities. Yet the true city, in my opinion, is the one we've described, the healthy one, as it were. But let's study a city with a fever, if that's what you want' (Rep. 372.d-373a; translations from Apology [9] and Republic [10] . For a comprehensive discussion of Plato's two cities, see [11] ). The healthy city, like the healthy man, is an austere one, in control of its appetites. In this context, the target is undoubtedly a feverish Athens.
The Socratic image of the austere life as the virtuous and just life was carried forward in the moral realm largely by the Stoics (though the Cynic Diogenes made a spectacle of austerity, as it were; see the discussion of shamelessness in [12] ) and transmitted through the western tradition in its Roman form. If there is a sense of decline from an austere virtue to an uncontrollable appetite in Socrates, that sense is overriding in Roman texts of the late Republic and early Imperial period [13] . It is immediately visible in Livy's Ab Urbe Condita (From the Founding of the City). In his preface, which dates from between 27 and 25 BC, Livy wishes his reader to reflect upon the virtues of Rome's founders and to note the decline in virtue that he believes to have infected it over time. 'No res publica', he writes, has ever been greater, or more sacred, or richer in good examples; nor have avarice and luxury immigrated so late into any state; nor has there been a place where so much honor was awarded for so long to poverty and frugality. In addition, by how much there was a lack of substance, by so much was there less desire; recently riches have brought in avarice, and overflowing pleasures, and lust ( [14] , praef.
11-12]).
Livy and Cicero bequeathed to history the incantation of the virtuous founders and othersRomulus, Cincinnatus, Camillus and Cato, who was a particular hero of the Stoics, for instancewhose examples are to be imitated whenever society shows signs of moral decline signalled by the private desire for wealth that trumps the common good. 2 Seneca, who along with Cicero probably had the greatest influence on subsequent writers in the Stoic moral tradition, asserted in the second of his Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium that 'It is not the man who has too little who is poor, but the one who hankers after more. Peter Brown has recently shown the engagement with Roman authors such as these by early Christian writers on the issue of wealth. Of particular importance for this discussion are the positions taken, respectively, by the late fourth and early fifth century figures, Ambrose, Jerome and Augustine. Indeed, Ambrose rewrote Cicero's De Officiis in order to adapt his conception of the res publica to the Church, but he also hearkened back to Seneca in invoking an innocent past when Nature's riches were shared, before the institution of private property [16] . The repeated attacks on avarice were Ambrose's instrument as he played to the ears of the poor, whom he understood as constituting a Christian populus, while reminding the rich of their responsibility of generosity. 3 Jerome, 'the persistent advocate of ascetic renunciation', mirrors Livy in bemoaning the decline of the Church from its heroic origin to his own times, when it 'has grown great in power and riches and has shrunk in spiritual energy' ( [16] , p. xxv). But Jerome's intention was in some sense opposite to Ambrose's. Jerome addressed the social elite and preached an extreme doctrine of sexual abstinence and a view of absolute poverty that hearkened back to the Cynics ( [16] , p. 266). But whereas Ambrose deployed his assault on greed in order to facilitate a cohesive Christian populus, some of the late Roman rich embraced Jerome's message as a mark of distinction, separating themselves from 'ordinary', less rigorous Christians. 4 Ambrose was himself part of the Roman elite before he became Bishop of Milan. Jerome came from a provincial backwater but had rich parents. One scholar has said of him that 'His attraction seems to have been to the ascetic idea rather than to the ascetic life' ( [17] , quoted in Brown [16] , p. 261). The same can be said of his patrons, for whom care of the poor was less important than their own self-image.
Augustine, like Jerome, came from the provinces, but grew up in relatively modest circumstances. When he described himself as poor he meant not that he was impoverished but rather not wealthy, or at least not as wealthy as others ( [16] , pp. 151-152). We should perhaps bear this in mind when, in The City of God, Augustine praises Roman examples of voluntary poverty accepted for the public good in order to deter any sense of pride on the part of Christians for making similar sacrifices. 'Those Romans', he writes, had a republic richly endowed with all resources (and 'republic' means 'state of the people', 'state of the country', 'commonwealth'), while they themselves lived in poverty in their own homes. So much so that one of them, who had already been consul twice, was dismissed from the senate by the censor's ban, because it was discovered that he had ten pounds of silver plate. Such was the poverty of men whose triumphs enriched the public treasury. It is a far nobler resolution that leads Christians to regard their riches as belonging to all, according to the principle described in the Acts of Apostles; by which everything is shared out according to individual need, no one claims anything as his individual property, and everything belongs to the common stock [18, 
Inspired in part by
communism', which entailed the abandonment of private property in favour of the public good, even if only in the small republic of the monastery ( [16] , pp. 178-183; Brown attributes the term 'spiritual communism' to Goulven Madec ( [16] , p. 183, no. 34)).
It was something akin to this that perhaps led Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels to remark that 'nothing is easier than to give to Christian asceticism a socialist tinge. Has not Christianity declaimed against private property, against marriage, against the state? Has it not preached their replacement by charity and poverty, celibacy and mortification of the flesh, monasticism and the organized church? Saintly socialism is but the holy water with which the priest blesses the fulminations of the aristocrat' [19] . Augustine's monastic model did indeed entail the abolition of private property, which is what set him apart from Cicero and Seneca, but the harsher model of Christianity belonged to Jerome, whose writings sustained rather than threatened his wealthy patrons. When we speak of Christian asceticism we blur the difference between these models. That difference, I wish to argue, is between asceticism and austerity.
Addressing a group of soon-to-be-created cardinals in February 2014, Pope Francis extolled them, 'please, to receive this appointment with a simple and humble heart. And, while you ought to do this with gladness and joy, do so in a way that this sentiment is far from any kind of expression of worldliness, from any celebration alien to the evangelical spirit of austerity, moderation and poverty' (http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/francesco/letters/ 2014/documents/papa-francesco_20140112_nuovi-cardinali_en.html#). Austerity and poverty are separate elements of the invoked spirit, while 'moderation' would seem to debar the extreme acts of mortification to which Marx and Engels refer. I understand the Pope's invocation of austerity to be closer in spirit to a Stoic austere moderation than to the self-denying poverty characteristic of the ascetic. 5 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, 'austere' is one way to define 'ascetic' in its adjectival form. However, while the latter can also be used as a noun, the former cannot. 6 The ascetic is 'One of those who in the early church retired into solitude, to exercise themselves in meditation and prayer, and in the practice of rigorous self-discipline by celibacy, fasting, and toil'. Or, 'One who is extremely rigorous in the practice of self-denial, whether by seclusion or by abstinence from creature comforts'. This sense of a practice of self-denial and abstinence is the one deployed by Max Weber in his famous Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, albeit in a post-Reformation world, once asceticism 'strode into the market-place of life, slammed the door of the monastery behind it, and undertook to penetrate just that daily routine of life with its methodicalness, to fashion it into a life in the world, but neither of nor for this world' [20] . In his discussion of the prodigal versus the frugal man, Adam Smith postulated that, while 'the passion for present enjoyment' is occasionally incapable of restraint, for most people most of the time 'the principle of frugality seems not only to predominate, but to predominate very greatly' because of a universal desire to better one's condition through saving ( [8] , pp. 341-342). For Weber, this principle is one that has become universal as a result of the Calvinist notion of a calling: 'the religious valuation of restless, continuous, systematic work in a worldly calling, as the highest means to asceticism, and at the same time the surest and most evident proof of rebirth and genuine faith, must have been the most powerful conceivable lever for the expansion of that attitude toward life which we have here called the spirit of capitalism' ( [20] important is the connection made by both Smith and Weber between asceticism and economic growth [21] . 7 To draw out the political significance in the present context between asceticism and austerity, consider the fact that the austere can be deployed as an aesthetic category while the ascetic carries no aesthetic meaning. Modernist art and design is austere in its minimalism, as exemplified by the architecture of Mies van der Rohe, who famously adopted the precept 'less is more'. In literature, the plays of Samuel Beckett exemplify an austere style. We may say of a desert landscape that it is austerely beautiful. The essence of austerity in this minimalist sense, as in the usage I attributed to Pope Francis above, is opposition to unnecessary ornament and ostentation, an ethic of simplicity and sufficiency [22, 23] . 8 Because the proponents of the so-called austerity measures and their opponents all understand austerity as asceticism, they are engaged in a dialogue that is bounded by the imperatives of economic growth, which is to say entirely within the logic of capitalism. It is in this context, within a late capitalist society, that what might otherwise be construed as a moral critique marshalled from the point of view of the austere life against the corruption engendered by the pursuit of material wealth could become a fundamental political critique. Recall that Smith argued that the austere system of morality is the moral system of the common people and that the fluctuation between it and the liberal moral system of the 'people of fashion' is related to 'the degree of disapprobation with which we ought to mark the vices of levity, the vices which are apt to arise from great prosperity, and from the excess of gaiety and good humour'. The popularity of Pope Francis and his focus on the austere life may then be seen in this context as a reaction against the perceived indulgences of unscrupulous bankers and brokers, as represented, for example, in Martin Scorcese's 2013 film The Wolf of Wall Street. It is important, however, to see also that, while possibly triggered by reaction, the austere life is embedded in a positive vision radically at odds with the one that drives the indulgences of the 'liberal system' and that it can formulate a conceptualization of a political economy that goes to the root of our common concerns. The Pope articulated this positive view through a critique of what he identified as the 'pathologies' of the contemporary economic system, one cause of which is 'our relationship with money, and our acceptance of its power over ourselves and our society'.
Consequently the financial crisis which we are experiencing makes us forget that its ultimate origin is to be found in a profound human crisis. In the denial of the primacy of human beings! We have created new idols. The worship of the golden calf of old (cf. Ex 32:15-34) has found a new and heartless image in the cult of money and the dictatorship of an economy which is faceless and lacking any truly humane goal.
The worldwide financial and economic crisis seems to highlight their distortions and above all the gravely deficient human perspective, which reduces man to one of his needs alone, namely, consumption. Worse yet, human beings themselves are nowadays considered as consumer goods which can be used and thrown away. We have started a throw-away culture. This tendency is seen on the level of individuals and whole societies; and it is being promoted! In circumstances like these, solidarity, which is the treasure of the poor, is often considered counterproductive, opposed to the logic of finance and the economy. While the income of a minority is increasing exponentially, that of the majority is crumbling. This imbalance results from ideologies which uphold the absolute autonomy of markets and financial speculation (http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/francesco/ speeches/2013/may/documents/papa-francesco_20130516_nuovi-ambasciatori_en.html). 7 Marx also saw a connection between Protestantism and capitalism: 'The cult of money has its asceticism, its self-denial, its self-sacrifice-economy and frugality, contempt for mundane, temporal and fleeting pleasures; the chase after the eternal treasure. Hence the connection between English Puritanism, or also Dutch Protestantism, and money-making' [21] . 8 Which is not to say that the objects produced by modernist minimalism could not take on a patina of luxury by a kind of inversion [22] . For a brilliant defence of the modernist aesthetic, see [23] . While the ascetic can be conceptualized as having an economic meaning when interpreted as frugality, or economizing of resources, there is a deep sense in which austerity as I have treated it here is a profoundly un-or anti-economic concept. The austere life goes beyond a rejection of consumption as a self-defining element of a virtuous minimalism available to those with wealth to spare. The austere life is antithetical to economic growth fuelled by the production and satisfaction of expanding need through the transformation of desire into need, which is of the essence of a capitalist economy. The bitter pills of the so-called austerity measures are justified in terms of future growth and are therefore a generalized ascetic programme based on an individual logic of self-restraint and deferred gratification aimed at the weakest elements of society. Opponents propose economic stimulus, which has the merit of sparing the weakest greater hardship but also the effect of preserving the order that systematically produces them.
The popularity in the USA of the minimalist gospel signals some level of dissatisfaction with the world of goods. Its individualist frame, however, promises more than it can deliver. By contrast, an austere politics entails the abandonment of the shared ascetic logic of growth. By abandoning that logic, a political economy geared towards redistribution is conceivable, as are policies directed towards new approaches to product design that might, for example, find greater acceptance of an austere aesthetic and durable materials as symbolizing a new social and political sensibility, in the manner briefly represented by the Bauhaus [24] . The possibility offered by the financial crisis of 2008, unlike the crisis to which the Bauhaus was a response, seems to have got lost, though some aspects of what are derisively dismissed as populist movements growing in significance in advanced capitalist societies may signal that a new opportunity could be emerging to begin to reimagine the austere life.
